Houthis
Insurgent Group
PF Score
26
Authority × 0.6 + Reach × 0.4
Authority Score
28
Capacity to coerce
Reach Score
22
Influence projection
Score Trajectory
The Houthis retain meaningful territorial control over northwestern Yemen including Sanaa, exercise taxation and parallel governance, and have demonstrated sustained military capacity — placing their …
The Houthis retain meaningful territorial control over Sanaa and western Yemen — governance structures, taxation, and military capacity predate and partially survive IRGC patronage — but the authority…
The Houthis' reach score is internally inconsistent relative to their authority: they have demonstrated consistent power projection through Red Sea shipping interdiction, drone and missile strikes int…
The Houthis retain meaningful but fragile territorial authority over northwestern Yemen including Sana'a, scoring above the non-state baseline (20) but well below the RSF peer (38) given continued mil…
With Iran's command architecture fractured, Houthi proxy coordination is degrading. Static baseline anchor (Yemen Houthi-controlled) at PF 10 represents territorial control floor. Current score of 28 …
The Houthis exercise fragmented but real territorial control over northwestern Yemen and key population centers, placing Authority above the non-state baseline (20) and the failed Yemen static anchor …
Score Reasoning
The Houthis exercise fragmented but real territorial control over northwestern Yemen and key population centers, placing Authority above the non-state baseline (20) and the failed Yemen static anchor (12) but well below consolidated actors like Sinaloa (42) or RSF (42); the ongoing nationwide military mobilization and exploitation of Saudi-UAE coalition fractures supports a modest upward nudge, but leadership losses to Israeli strikes and degraded supply chains constrain meaningful consolidation. Reach is hard-capped at 30 (patron IRGC PF) and scored at 22 — the Houthis' primary external instrument was their Iranian-supplied missile/drone capacity for Red Sea interdiction, but the Feb 28 reactivation announcement has not materialized into sustained operations per the March 11 event, guidance component stockpiles are depleted and unreplaceable, and the pivot toward autonomous territorial consolidation signals a contraction of external projection rather than expansion. The patron (IRGC PF 30, Iran PF 26) has itself collapsed from 48 to 26 on reach, propagating structural dependency degradation directly into Houthi Reach; the group retains latent coercive leverage via the Red Sea threat but cannot currently convert that into durable external influence, placing it above Handala (14) and at or just above ISIS (28) on reach but below TTP (36) which retains cross-border operational capacity.
Recent Events
Houthi Strategic Restraint and Ground Force Mobilization During U.S.-Iran War
Mar 2026Despite repeated public pledges to retaliate against any attack on Iran, the Houthis have refrained from launching missiles or conducting Red Sea attacks during the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict. This restraint coincides with a sustained, underreported nationwide military mobilization across Houthi-controlled territory, framed as 'Al-Aqsa Flood' training programs cycling government, civilian, and tribal structures through military training. The movement has lost significant senior military and political leadership to Israeli precision strikes, seen its Iranian supply chain disrupted, and faces degraded missile stockpiles with unreplaceable guidance components. Simultaneously, the Houthis are exploiting the fracturing of the Saudi-UAE coalition in southern Yemen and maintaining coercive economic leverage through the implicit threat of resumed Red Sea operations. The group appears to be repositioning from a proxy missile force serving Iranian strategic interests toward an autonomous territorial actor preparing for land-based expansion in Yemen.
Iranian Retaliation Wave — Strikes Across Middle East (Feb 28, 2026)
Feb 2026Following Operation Epic Fury, Iran launched immediate and unprecedented retaliatory missile and drone strikes targeting US military assets and allied Gulf states. Countries hit or targeted: UAE confirmed strikes (luxury hotel on Palm Jumeirah struck, 4 injured, Dubai airport suspended, 1 killed in Abu Dhabi); Bahrain confirmed US Navy HQ struck; Kuwait confirmed hits; Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar all intercepted missiles. Qatar Al Udeid Air Base targeted (largest US air base in Middle East, approximately 10,000 US troops). Israel hit by missile barrage; national state of emergency declared; 89 minor injuries. Iraq Erbil airport (US base) targeted. Iran stated rationale: use remaining arsenal while it still has it before further degradation. Houthis announced immediate resumption of Red Sea shipping strikes in solidarity. Strait of Hormuz announced closed by Iran; roughly 20 percent of world oil supply at risk; OPEC+ convened emergency session on production increase. UN Security Council emergency session called for 1600 EST. European leaders called for diplomacy; declined to endorse operation. PF Signal: Widens sovereignty gaps across entire Gulf. UAE, Bahrain, Qatar sovereignty visibly penetrated. Iran demonstrates tactical reach remains even as strategic reach is being destroyed. Houthi reactivation extends retaliation envelope to Red Sea. Strait closure is the systemic shock vector affecting every oil-importing economy globally.